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Imagining Disasters in the Era of Climate Change: Is Japan ᤀs
Seawall a New Maginot Line?
Peter Matanle, Joel Littler and Oliver Slay
 
Abstract
Following  the  Great  East  Japan  earthquake,
tsunami  and  nuclear  disaster  of  11  March
2011,  the  Japanese  government  began
constructing a series of 440 seawalls along the
north-eastern  coast  of  Honshu.  Cumulatively
measuring  394.2km,  they  are  designed  to
defend  coastal  communities  against  tsunami
that frequently strike the region. We present a
case study of the new seawall in Tarō, Iwate
Prefecture,  which had previously  constructed
massive  sea  defences  in  the  wake  of  two
tsunami  in  1896  and  1933,  which  were
subsequently  destroyed  in  2011.  We  ask
whether the government has properly imagined
the next disaster for the era of climate change
and, therefore, whether its rationale for Tarō ?s
new seawall  is  sufficient.  We argue that  the
government  has  implemented an incremental
strengthening  of  Tarō ?s  existing  tsunami
defence infrastructure. Significantly, this does
not anticipate global warming driven sea level
rise, which is accelerating, and which requires
transformational  adaptation.  This  continues a
national pattern of disaster preparedness and
response established in the early 20th century,
which  resulted  in  the  failure  to  imagine  the
2011 tsunami.  We conclude  by  recalling  the
lessons of  France ?s Maginot Line and invoke
the  philosophy  of  Tanaka  Shōzō,  father  of
Japan ?s modern environmental movement, who
urged Japanese to adjust to the flow (nagare) of
nature, rather than defend against it, lest they
are  undone  by  the  force  of  its  backflow
(gyakuryū).
 
Keywords: Tsunami; Disaster; Reconstruction;
Infrastructure;  Japan; Climate change;  Global
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Man is a part of  nature,  and his
war against nature is inevitably a
war against himself.
Rachel Carson, 1963.
 
Introduction
Following  the  Great  East  Japan  earthquake,
tsunami  and  nuclear  disaster  of  11  March
2011, in 2012 the Japanese government began
constructing a series of 440 seawalls along the
north-eastern  coast  of  Honshu.  Cumulatively
measuring 394.2  km (Table  1),  they  connect
with natural formations along the coast of the
three eastern prefectures of  Tōhoku  ? Iwate,
Miyagi  and  Fukushima   ?  to  form  a  single
barrier  against  destructive  tsunami  that
frequently  strike  the  region.1  In  2011,  for
example, the majority of casualties and damage
were  due  not  to  the  earthquake,  but  the
tsunami  that  struck  approximately  forty
minutes  later,  as  existing  defences  were
overwhelmed,  and  communities  swept  away
(Box 1).  Nationwide a total  of 18,440 people
have  been  declared  dead  or  missing,  with
121,852  buildings  totally  destroyed  and
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281,042  half-destroyed  (NPA,  2016).2
We present a case study of the new tsunami
defences  taking  shape  in  Tarō  in  Iwate
Prefecture,3  a  town  which  had  previously
constructed  2.4  kilometres  of  seawall  of
between 10 and 13.7 metres in height in the
wake of two tsunami in 1896 and 1933, which
was  destroyed  in  2011.  Tarō ?s  example  is
significant because its experience prior to 2011
informs  post-2011  reconstruction  plans  and
their rationales in Tōhoku. Though, as we argue
below, climate change4 is a present-day reality
worldwide  and  all  coastal  regions  need  to
consider whether and how they adapt to the
particular risks facing their communities.
Despite the accumulation of research into the
2011 disaster in Japan, perhaps due to Tarō ?s
small size and merger into Miyako City, with
the notable exceptions of Smits ? (2014: 51-52,
174-75),  Strusińska-Correia ?s  (2017),  and
Takezawa ?s  (2016:  xix,  178)  mentions  of  the
town within the context of larger studies, there
has  been  no  detailed  scholarly  analysis  in
English  about  this  town ?s  experience  of
tsunami.  Moreover,  few  studies  in  English
provide  a  close  examination  of  specific  local
infrastructures; and those researchers who do
examine  local  structures  rarely  frame  their
descriptions  within  a  broader  contextual
analysis.  Furthermore,  although  excellent
overview  analyses  of  post-2011  tsunami
defence infrastructure  in  Japan are  available
(See: Strusińska-Correia, 2017 and Suppasri et
al, 2016), we know of no case study in English
which  situates  post-tsunami  settlement
reconstruction and defence along the Tōhoku
coastline  within  the  context  of  Japan ?s
historical  development  and  experience  with
tsunami,  and which simultaneously addresses
the  twin  21st  century  chal lenges  o f
depopulation and climate change, in particular
global warming driven sea level rise.
Below we provide a detailed empirical study of
the history of Tarō ?s tsunami experiences, an
analysis of the reconstruction of the town and
its  seawall  since 2011,  and we situate these
within  Tōhoku ?s  and  Japan ?s  20th  and  21st
century contexts. Significantly, we take careful
note  of  the  consequences  of  global  warming
driven  sea  level  rise  for  presenting  a  new
contex tua l  env i ronment  requ i r ing
transformative adaptation in tsunami disaster
risk reduction.
Our  study  employs  a  multi-disciplinary  and
multi-methods  approach  for  triangulation,
depth,  and  rigour,  including  inductive  and
deductive information gathering and cycling, in
accordance  with  case  study  analysis  for
sustainability  research  in  critical  human
geography  (Yin,  2004;  Fahy  &  Rau,  2013;
Graham,  1999;  Madsen  &  Adriansen,  2004).
Our  research  is  therefore  significant  for
informing  resilience  building  in  post-growth
settings worldwide in an era of climate change,
wherever coastal communities are under threat
of tsunami inundation. The study includes:
Systematic  review of  central  and  local
government planning documentation,
Historical near-Earth composite imagery
in  combination  with  ground  level
photographic observation for longitudinal
verification and accuracy,
Participant observation involving five site
visits to Tōhoku between 2011 and 2017
 ?  the  most  recent  including  ten  days
driving the length of the eastern Tōhoku
coastline   ?  to  observe  settlement  and
defence reconstruction in various locales,
interact  with  local  residents,  and
experience  post-tsunami  local  life.
Interviews and information checks with
Japanese  local  and  central  government
officials and geological scientists.
In this research we inquire into the necessity of
the  reconstructed  tsunami  defences  at  Tarō,
given  that  Tarō ?s  population  is  shrinking,
residential zones are being relocated to higher
ground, and escape routes improved. Indeed,
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a s  w e  s h a l l  s e e ,  t h e  w a l l  m a y  b e
counterproductive to efficient and rapid escape
to higher ground. Second, we ask how effective
these defences will be against future tsunami.
All but one of the manmade tsunami defences
built in Tōhoku failed in 2011, with just Fudai
Village ?s  massive  wall  and  gate,  which  lie
inland and are thus more effective, surviving
intact while allowing overtopping, resulting in
just one death (Normile, 2012; Suppasri et al,
2013; Takezawa, 2016). Significantly, none of
the  government ?s  published  post-2011
recommendations imagine the potential scale of
future  tsunami  by  including  global  warming
driven sea level rise as a transformative change
in  the  local  risk  environment.  We  ask,
therefore, whether the government ?s rationale
for  the wall  is  sufficient  and whether  it  has
properly imagined the next disaster.
Although DeWit (2014; 2016a; 2016b) argues
persuasively  for  Japan ?s  success  with  post-
Fukushima  energy  resilience  and  climate
change  mitigation,5  with  respect  to  coastal
adaptation in rural locales we argue below that
Japan  i s  ye t  t o  adop t  a  necessar i l y
transformational approach suitable for an era
of  depopulation,  global  warming,  and
increasing severity of  ?mega disasters ?. This is
despite the fact that the government has stated
its  intention to  do so  in  its  National  Spatial
Strategy and through being a signatory to the
Paris  Agreement  of  December  2015  (MLIT,
2014 & 2015; UNFCCC, 2017). Consequently,
we  contend  that  the  seawall  represents  an
incremental  improvement  on  pre-2011
defences.  The  wall  is  thus  more  aptly
understood  as  a  continuation  of  the  20th
century  Japanese  Construction  State  and  its
habitual deployment of concrete infrastructure
to  correct  for  an  assumed  dangerous  and
defective nature (See:  Bird,  2013;  Takezawa,
2016￼) ￼  We  conclude  by  arguing  against
preparing for the past by failing to imagine the
future, and we invoke the philosophy of Tanaka
Shōzō, father of Japan ?s modern environmental
movement, who urged Japanese to live within
and  adjust  to  the  flow  (nagare)  of  nature,
rather  than  fight  against  it,  lest  they  are
undone by the force of its backflow (gyakuryū)
(Stolz, 2007; 2014; Tanaka, 2004 & 2005).
Before  describing  the  historical  context  of
Tarō ?s decision to build its  wall,  we need to
clarify three issues. First, we are as concerned
as  anyone  about  the  levels  of  greenhouse
gasses (GHG) in the Earth ?s atmosphere, which
passed 415ppm of carbon dioxide concentration
for the first time in human history on 12 May
2019 (Scripps Institution, 2019). Japan bears a
heavy responsibility both as the world ?s third
largest economy and its accumulated historical
emissions as the earliest industrialised country
in  Asia.  Nevertheless,  this  article  is  about
coastal  adaptation  to  the  actual  or  expected
outcomes of climate change, and discussion of
mitigation  measures  is  beyond  our  scope.
Second, we do not wish to single out Japan as
exceptionally unresponsive to climate change.
Rather,  nearly  all  countries  are  doing
considerably  less  than  necessary  to
acknowledge,  prepare  for,  and  adapt  to  sea
level  rise,  among  many  other  outcomes  of
global warming. Third, our research is rooted
in the perspectives of critical human geography
and we do not offer alternatives or solutions,
which again would be beyond our scope and a
d i s t r a c t i o n  f r o m  o u r  f o c u s  o n  t h e
reconstruction  of  Tarō  and  its  tsunami
defences.
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Box  1:  Surveying  the  extent  of  tsunami
damage  and  reconstruction  in  Tarō  and
Tōhoku.
Below are  four  short  films  made using  near
Earth remote sensing composite imagery from
Google Earth Pro.  They survey Tarō and the
coastlines  of  Iwate,  Miyagi  and  Fukushima
prefectures,  featuring  selected  towns  and
topographic features. Yellow, red, and purple
lines are 10m, 15m, and 20m contours marking
elevation above sea level, using K. Tani ?s GIS
c o n t o u r  d a t a  ( s e e  h e r e
(http://ktgis.net/tohoku_data/index_e.html)).
Please click on the thumbnail  image to view
each film.
Film 1. Tarō - (3m10s)
Tarō ?s location as a ria town on Iwate ?s coast  ?
Coastal  defences   ?  Overview  from  various
angles  showing  damage  and  reconstruction
challenges  ? Main seawall  ? Port area  ? New
residential zone  ? Agricultural, education, and
industrial  zones  -  Solar  farm   ?  Parks  and
amenities zone  ? Zoom out.
See the film here
(https://tinyurl.com/y2es7ck6).
Film 2. Iwate Prefecture - (4m33s).
Aerial  view  of  Iwate ?s  ria  coastline,  with
significant settlements  ? Miyako, the long ria,
small  settlements,  and main town  ?  Ongoing
reconstruction  of  residential  zones  &
infrastructure   ?  Kamaishi  and  its  tsunami
barrier   ?  Rikuzentakata  and  its  seawall   ?
Reconstruction of Rikuzentakata  ? Zoom out.
See the film here
(https://tinyurl.com/y5wrj9dg).
Film 3. Miyagi Prefecture - (3m12s)
Aerial  view  of  Miyagi  coast   ?  Zoom  to
Ishinomaki City  ? Ridge protecting inland areas
 ? Sendai Plain  ? Coastal  plain south through
Natori & Watari  ? Long seawall  ? Zoom out.
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See the film here
(https://tinyurl.com/y6kvamkc).
Film 4. Fukushima Prefecture - (3m04s)
Fukushima coastline  ? Long and straight with
sett lements  separated  by  mountains
 ?Minamisoma  ? Seawall   ? Namie & Futaba  ?
Fukushima  Daiichi  Nuclear  Power  Plant   ?
Okuma & Tomioka ?  Fukushima Daini  NPP  ?
Zoom out.
See the film here
(https://tinyurl.com/y334jq5t).
 
Tarō and Sanriku on 11 March 2011
Tarō  is  located  in  the  northern  part  of  the
Sanriku region of Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures
(Box 1); located approximately 130km west of
the Japan Trench tectonic subduction zone. The
area is famous for its picturesque ria coastline
(Photo  1),6  with  settlements  built  on  narrow
alluvial  fans  nestled  between  steep  forested
mountainsides at the head of each ria. Tarō is
one such town.
 
Photos  1-4,7  Click  on  the  photos  for  an
expanded slideshow of  all  images and tables
used in this article. Click on the hyperlinks for
a Google Earth view.
Photo  1  (https://tinyurl.com/y6ns4sn9):
The  entrance  to  Tarō ?s  ria,  showing  a
bank  of  tetrapods,  reconstructed  since
2011. Tsunami amplification due to the
ria ?s  topography  can  be  deduced  from
this image.
Photo  2  (https://tinyurl.com/y3ajdaoa):
The   ?Tsunami  Prevent ion  Town
Declaration ?  (Tsunami  bōsai  no  machi
sengen) inscribed in granite and placed
at the entrance to Tarō ?s administrative
offices, post-2011.
Photo  3  (https://tinyurl.com/y52cfb93):
The Tarō Fishing Coop port tower, with
yellow  markers  for  the  1896,  1933  &
2011 tsunami, displaying 17.3m for the
latter. For scale, Peter Matanle is under
the markers.
Photo 4 (https://tinyurl.com/yydfzrjs): The
Tarō Kankō Hotel from where Satoshi Itō
viewed the advancing tsunami. The hotel
is preserved in its post-tsunami state as a
visitor centre, memorial, and warning. 
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Sanriku  is  a  known  tsunami  disaster  zone.
Despite  efforts  to  discourage  settlement  in
vulnerable  locations,  regular  disaster  drills,
and  the  construction  of  massive  concrete
coastal  defence  infrastructure,  loss  of  life
occurs repeatedly when tsunami strike. Indeed,
humanity has yet to prove capable of defending
against  tsunami  of  the  size  and  power  that
struck Tōhoku on 11 March 2011. The disaster
was  notable  due  to  many  towns  having
constructed advanced sea defences, which may
have provided a false sense of security, since
all but those in Fudai were either destroyed or
damaged (Furuta & Seino, 2016; Onishi, 2011).
Stretching from northern Iwate to the Ōtsuchi
Peninsula in Miyagi, the ria topography itself
contributes  to  disaster  severity  by  funnelling
advancing  tsunami,  raising  their  height  and
amplifying their power (Hayashi, 2012). 
Tarō was its own municipality until 2005, when
it  and  neighbouring  Niisato  Village  were
absorbed into  Miyako City  under  the  ?Heisei
gappei ? municipal mergers.8 The population of
Tarō has been reduced by more than half since
the  1960s,  with  accelerating  ageing  and
depopulation  (Figure  1).  Miyako  too  is
shrinking,  losing  more  than  a  quarter  since
1960. Tarō shows the classic characteristics of
Japan ?s  shrinking  regions,  and  the  recent
acceleration in depopulation is not only due to
the tsunami  but  the  town ?s  increasing death
rate as ageing intensifies,  a decreasing birth
rate as the number of adults of child-bearing
age declines and low fertility continues,9  and
out-migration  by  younger  adults  seeking
educational,  employment,  and  social
opportunities  in  urban  areas  (See:  Matanle,
2006;  Matanle  &  Rausch  et  al,  2011;  MIC,
2018).  Significantly,  in  2008  the  Japanese
population  as  a  whole  began  shrinking,
rendering  expectations  for  growth  in  Tarō
unrealistic,  and  post-tsunami  long-term
reconstruction  planning  challenging;  since
under  a  conventional  reconstruction scenario
new housing and infrastructure may in future
decades  become  underutilised  as  the  town
continues to shrink.
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Older  people  are  especially  vulnerable  to
disasters (McMillan, 2014; Ngo, 2012). During
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the Gulf
coast nursing home residents were unable to
evacuate  independently  and  triage  protocols
prevented  treatment  for  chronic  conditions.
There, 71% of deceased victims were over 60
years  old  and 47% over  75,  exceeding their
15%  of  the  resident  population  (Klein  and
Nagel,  2007).  Similarly,  in  2010,  30.9%  of
Miyako ?s and 33.0% of Tarō ?s populations were
aged  65  or  over,  comfortably  qualifying  as
hyper-aged  communities,  defined  as  21%  or
more of the population over 65 (Coulmas, 2007:
5). In Tōhoku, of the 13,135 people assigned a
cause of death by 11 April 2011, 65.2% were 60
or over and 92.5% had drowned (Japan Times,
2011). Mainly for mobility reasons many older
people were unable to reach safety and we can
assume that  many  disabled   ?  who  are  often
older  ? also fell victim. Tarō and other hyper-
aged  communities  in  coastal  Tōhoku  are
therefore  especially  vulnerable  to  tsunami.
Ageing  and  depopulat ion  are  g lobal
phenomena, and Japan is in the vanguard in
Asia.  Indeed,  nearly  half  of  the  world ?s
countries  are  now  experiencing  below-
replacement  fertility,  and  more  than  30
countries  have  shrinking  populations  (GBD
2017  Causes  of  Death  Collaborators,  2018).
China,  South  Korea,  and  Taiwan  are  rapidly
ageing and expect to begin depopulating soon.
Even relatively  youthful  Anglophone societies
with higher rates of immigration such as New
Zealand  are  experiencing  ageing  and
depopulation  processes  sub-nationally  and  in
disaster  prone  areas  (Jackson  and  Brabyn,
2017;  Jackson  and  Felmingham,  2002;
McMillan,  2014).  All  these  countries  are
located  on  the  Pacific  Ring  of  Fire  and
experience  frequent  tectonic  events.  Beyond
building resilience at home, therefore, Japan ?s
significance  lies  in  how  disasters  and  their
human  responses  inform  other  countries  as
they  enter  their  own  post-growth  pathways,
particularly  in  disaster-prone regions of  East
and Southeast Asia (Matanle, 2013). Then there
is  climate  change  and  its  transformative
contribution  to  the  dynamics  of  human-
environmental  interactions.
 
 
NOAA (2019)10 lists 134 known fatal11 tsunami
in Iwate since the Mw8.6 Jōgan earthquake in
869CE, which killed an estimated 1,000 people.
Of  these,  85  had  parent  earthquakes  in  the
Japan Trench. Eleven of the most powerful are
shown  in  Figure  2.  Among  NOAA ?s  listed
tsunami,  17  note  runup  occurring  at  Tarō,
beginning  with  the  1611CE  Mw8.1  Keichō
Sanriku earthquake, whose tsunami advanced
1.2km inland with a maximum run-up of 25m,
and  killed  approximately  5,000  people
nationwide  (NOAA,  2019).  This  earthquake
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occurred six years after the Keichō Nankaidō
earthquake,  whose  tsunami  killed  more  than
5,000 people in central Honshu, and just two
and a half months after the Aizu earthquake,
which  killed  approximately  3,700  people  in
central  Tōhoku.  The  unpredictability  of
earthquakes is underlined by Smits (2014) in
his  detailed  history  of  earthquakes  in  Japan,
and  re in fo rced  by  Lay  (2015 ) ,  who
demonstrates a surge in the number of great
earthquakes worldwide in the decade 2004-14,
by 265% compared to 1900-2004.
Hence, although earthquakes along the Japan
Trench  can  occur  in  a  regular  sequence,
unexpected combinations of events also occur.
Drawing  on  the  example  of  2011,  which
included a serious accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant, in the 21st century
it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  powerful
earthquakes and tsunami are likely to intersect
with other risk vectors -  climate change and
industrial  infrastructure  -  to  generate
compound  techno-environmental  events  of
great complexity and severity (Matanle, 2011).
Of the 27,122 people killed in the 1896 Meiji
Sanriku tsunami, Tarō lost 1,867, or 83.1% of
the  town ?s  population,  and  all  registered
buildings were destroyed (Table 2) (Yamashita,
2003; Hayashi 2012). The 1933 Shōwa Sanriku
tsunami  also  had  a  devastating  impact,
destroying  500  of  559  buildings,  and  killing
32%  of  Tarō ?s  2,773  population  (Yamashita,
2003). Hence, in 1934 the townspeople began
to build a huge defensive seawall. 
 
 
Completed in  1978,  Tarō ?s  pre-2011 physical
tsunami  defence  infrastructure  was  mainly
comprised of three walls forming an X shape
(Figure  3).  This  was  in  addition  to  port
breakwaters and a bank of concrete tetrapods
at the mouth of the ria facing east towards the
Japan Trench for advance protection (Figure 3;
Photo 1). In total 2,433m of seawall at a height
of 10.0-13.7m was constructed between 1934
and 1978,  forming  what  was  considered  the
most comprehensive tsunami barrier in Japan;
this  was  superseded in  2009 by  the  world ?s
deepest  breakwater  at  Kamaishi  (USD1.5
billion), which also failed in 2011 (Ogasawara
and Sakai, 2012; Yamashita, 2003).
Due to their overwhelming stature dominating
the surrounding town, Tarō ?s seawalls became
known as the Nihon no Banri no Chōjō  [The
Great Wall  of  Japan] (Nikkei,  2011),  and the
town  earned  the  nickname  Tsunami  Tarō
[Tsunami Boy] (Inoue, 2013). On the seventieth
anniversary of the Shōwa Sanriku tsunami in
2003, Tarō Town Office published its  ?Tsunami
Prevention Town Declaration ? (Tsunami bōsai
no machi sengen), which described the walls as
a symbol of the resilience of Tarō in defending
against  tsunami  (Yamashita,  2003).  The
declaration acknowledged the fear unleashed,
and  declared  the  walls  representing  the
townspeople's  defiant  courage  (chōsen  suru
yūki)  (Photo  2).  Though  the  walls  became
symbolic of Tarō ?s identity and pride, in 2011
they did not protect the town as effectively as
those who drafted the declaration had hoped
(Figures 3 & 4).
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Prior  to  the  construction  of  Tarō ?s  pre-2011
walls the two most destructive recent tsunami
had been the 14.6m Meiji Sanriku and 10.1m
Showa  Sanriku  tsunami  (Hayashi,  2012).
Subsequent  to  beginning  construction,  four
tsunami  had  struck  Tarō  between  1934  and
2011, causing minimal damage (Hayashi, 2012;
Inoue,  2013).  This  included the 1960 Mw9.5
Valdivia earthquake near Chile, whose tsunami
ki l led  53  people  in  Ōfunato  and  41  in
Minamisanriku,  Iwate.  Since  the  walls
prevented  damage  from  relatively  common
smaller  tsunami,  they  were  assumed  to  be
sufficient.
The Failure of Tarō ᤀs Seawalls
Shortly  after  3.00pm on 11 March 2011 the
tsunami  broke  through  the  tetrapods,
destroyed the port breakwaters, and overcame
all  three  seawalls,  demolishing  the  newer
second seawall (Figures 3 & 4  ? Area D), killing
166 people and demolishing 979 buildings. The
tsunami ?s officially recorded height in Tarō was
15.75m, 1.1m higher than in 1896, and around
5.3m higher  than  the  existing  seawalls.  The
Tarō Fishing Cooperative ?s port tower registers
the tsunami reaching 17.3m (Photo 3), or 6.9m
higher than the wall.  The first  wall  survived
structurally  intact;  but  massive  overtopping
caused damage to buildings behind (Figures 3
& 4 - Area A).
The main reason for the infrastructure failure
was  over-confidence  in  predicting  the
maximum magnitude of future earthquakes as
well as the height and strength of associated
tsunami. Seventy-four per cent of seawalls in
Tōhoku were built on assumptions of an Mw8
earthquake triggered tsunami, not the Mw9.0
quake of 2011 (Cyranoski, 2012). Despite this,
Davis  et  al  (2012)  suggest  that  3/11  was  a
 ?missed opportunity ? for disaster preparedness,
because  a  powerful  undersea  quake  with  a
giant tsunami occurring within the foreseeable
future had been anticipated. In 2001, they had
identified with a 70% certainty that an Mw8+
earthquake would occur. Furthermore, Satake
et al (2007) assumed a 99% probability of an
Mw8.1-8.3  earthquake  occurring  within  30
years.  Neither  of  these  studies,  however,
anticipated the Mw9.0+ event.  Indeed, Smits
(2014:  22-23)  argues  that  the  change  from
using the Richter scale to moment magnitude
as a method for measuring earthquake strength
from  the  late-1970s  onwards,  and  historical
earthquakes ? subsequent re-classification, may
in part have contributed to the lack of studies
predicting a Mw9.0+ earthquake for the Japan
Trench region.
Secondly, initial warnings underestimated the
tsunami ?s size (Nakahara, 2011) (Table 3), and
residents ?  behavior  during  the  preceding
minutes  suggests  the  seawalls  gave  a  false
sense  of  security.  Three  minutes  after  the
earthquake,  Iwate  Prefecture  announced  a
3m+ tsunami warning. This was standard for
Mw8.0+ earthquakes and, according to drills,
residents  should  have  evacuated.  Then,  44
minutes after the earthquake, the announced
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height was upgraded to 10m+. Possibly this did
not provide enough evacuation time for some of
those who had been slow respond to the initial
w a r n i n g .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h e  J a p a n
Meteorological  Association ?s  observed  wave
heights  were  recorded  using  floating  buoys,
some of which ceased data collection, having
been damaged by the very tsunami they were
designed to measure (Ozaki, 2011).
 
 
Thirdly,  eyewitness Itō Satoshi,  owner of  the
Tarō Kankō Hotel, who observed the tsunami
from the fourth  floor  of  his  hotel  (Photo  4),
recounts  people  milling  around  behind  the
walls,  apparently  unaware  of  the  danger,
despite  broadcasted  warnings.  He  suggested
that, although they had felt the earthquake, the
high  walls  prevented  them  from  seeing  the
approaching wave,  nor  were they rushing to
evacuate due to their sense of safety behind the
walls. Itō called out to warn them and filmed
the  wave.  According  to  Itō,  the  areas
immediately  behind  the  seawalls  had  the
highest  mortality,  compared  to  other  areas
where people had seen the advancing wave and
quickly  moved  to  higher  ground  along
evacuation  routes  (Shifleen,  2015).
Although the proportion of casualties in 2011
was lower than in the two most serious recent
tsunami,  at  3.9%  of  the  town ?s  population
(Table 2), suggesting that the wall saved many
lives,  additional  factors  may  also  have
contributed  to  reduced  mortality.
Advanced construction techniques using
concrete  and  steel  frames  for  new
buildings.
Retrofitt ing  older  bui ldings  for
earthquake safety.
The population in 2011 had increased by
92% and 55% since 1896 and 1933, and
there were 325% more buildings than in
1896.  Many  newer  structures  were
located on higher ground inland of Zones
A,  B and C (Figures 3 & 4)  and were
unaffected.
Tarō ?s  pre-2011  investment  in  soft-
infrastructure  was  considerable
(Yamashita, 2003). This included coastal
forests; disaster radio, satellite receivers,
and  observation  cameras;  evacuation
drills and disaster memorials; evacuation
sites  and  routes;  hosting  a  coastal
municipality  tsunami  summit,  etc.
Further, an alternative explanation is emerging
from Tōhoku  of  the  relative  effectiveness  of
hard  defence  infrastructure.  Aldrich  (2019;
Aldrich & Sawada, 2015) compared mortality
for different communities along the entire coast
of  the  three  most  affected  prefectures  and
found that social  capital  stocks were a more
significant  predictor,  and  that  differential
mortality rates were also due to the pace of
evacuation.  Importantly,  his  research  shows
that social capital is also a better predictor for
post-disaster  survival  and  recovery,  with
communities possessing higher levels of capital
recovering  more  rapidly  (2019).  Finally,  the
failure of seawall 2 (Figure 3) may have had a
negative impact on survival.  It  is  sensible to
assume tsunami defences are more effective if
they  remain  standing.  The  collapsing  wall
probably  caused a  water  surge,  much like  a
dam failure,  accelerating  the  wave ?s  velocity
and increasing its  destructive  power (Kanda,
2016).
 APJ | JF 17 | 13 | 1
11
Tarō ?s experience with seawalls is significant
because  the  townspeople ?s  decision  to  build
what was considered long-term protection was
in response to the 1896 and 1933 disasters and
is  a  cautionary  example  for  the  post-2011
decision to build a comprehensive barrier along
the coastline of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima
prefectures.  Among  the  additional  100km of
seawall nearing completion in Tōhoku, 49.5 km
of  which  is  over  10m  in  height,  the  new
defences  at  Tarō  wi l l  be  14.7m  high
(Reconstruction  Agency,  2015),  2.6m  lower
than  the  height  of  the  2011  tsunami  as
measured  on  the  Fishing  Cooperative ?s  port
tower.  Assuming  the  continuation  of  current
conditions  and  the  successful  experience  of
Fudai  Village  in  2011  with  overtopping,  the
new seawall  will  likely save considerable life
and damage. We now proceed to analysing the
new defences and their emerging 21st century
context.
 
Reconstructing  Tarō  and  its  Tsunami
Defences
Tarō
On 1 June 2011 Miyako City began formulating
its basic reconstruction plan and, after a series
of open meetings on matters such as housing,
education, health, transportation, and industry,
presented  a  basic  plan  to  citizens  on  14
October.  Citizens  had  four  days  to  respond
before the City Office finalised the plan on 31
October.  Since  then  the  City  Office  has
regularly  consulted  residents  about  their
reactions  to  current  progress  and  delivery,
though the extent to which citizen voices are
genuinely incorporated into plans, or whether
loca l  au thor i t i es  have  su f f i c ien t l y
communicated  their  rationales  to  citizens,  is
contested.12 Indeed, residents in Tarō and along
the Tōhoku coast expressed concern that they
wanted  a  greater  say  in  post-tsunami
reconstruction planning, which is corroborated
by Strusińska-Correia (2017).
 
 
Figure 5 shows a Google Earth image of Tarō
taken on 9 January 2016 with the town ?s basic
reconstruction plan superimposed. Noteworthy
aspects are:
Formerly forested mountainside located
behind cliffs (north-east yellow) has been
appropriated for housing and amenities,
including a hospital (Photos 5 & 6).
A  second  residential  housing  zone  is
under  construction  to  the  north-west
(yellow).  Slightly  higher  than  the  port
area, this is being raised by up to three
metres.  Some  housing  will  be  taller
structures with rooftop evacuation. West
of  this  (brown)  wi l l  be  a  school ,
amenities, and park space doubling as an
evacuation zone (Photo 7).
A  third  residential  zone  is  under
construction in  a  forested mountainous
area to  the south,  out  of  range of  the
image,  and  connected  to  the  town  by
road. It too is protected by cliffs.
Low-lying areas in the town centre are
reserved  for  parks,  sports  pitches,
amenities  (brown;  Photo  8),  marine
industrial and business facilities, a solar
farm (purple;  Photo  9),  retail  facilities
(pink; Photo 10), and transportation (red,
dotted lines; Photo 11). There will be no
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housing here and signposted evacuation
routes are under construction.
Areas  along  the  river  valley  stretching
westwards  from  the  south  will  be  a
railway  station  zone  (red);  information
and  communications  technology  zone
(purple); education zone around a senior
high school (brown); and an agricultural
zone (green). These areas are either on
higher ground or located inland.
As the photos show, there is much to do and it
is possible the plans are unrealistically costly in
reconstructing what is already an ageing and
shrinking community which in future decades,
and in all likelihood, will not require all of the
housing,  services,  and  infrastructure  being
built under the present plans (Matanle, 2013).
 
Photos 5-11 (Clockwise from the top). Click on
the photos for a slideshow and hyperlinks for a
Google Earth view.
Google Earth view
(https://tinyurl.com/y4vlpsnl)
Google Earth view
(https://tinyurl.com/y24m7xmw)
G o o g l e  E a r t h  v i e w
(https://t inyurl.com/y3s7l5xp)
G o o g l e  E a r t h  v i e w
(https://tinyurl.com/y6rzny95)
G o o g l e  E a r t h  v i e w
(https://tinyurl.com/y4l9ju8u)
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G o o g l e  E a r t h  v i e w
(https://tinyurl.com/y3r5cxzo)
Google Earth view
(https://tinyurl.com/y5zzo8b5)
Concrete seawalls are built for primary defence
against  storm  surges,  tsunami  and  coastal
erosion, and may be used in conjunction with
breakwaters,  natural  reefs,  sand  beaches,
lagoons,  forests,  canals,  levees,  manmade
banks,  and  road  embankments  (Tokida  &
Tanimoto, 2014; Koshimura et al, 2014). Built-
up  areas  close  to  the  coast  often  rely  on  a
seawall alone, or a harbour with breakwaters.
Tetrapods are also deployed either onshore or
near-shore.  Throughout  Tōhoku  on  3/11,
including Tarō, each of these suffered damage
or destruction (Mikami et al, 2012). Although
Strusińska-Correia  (2017)  analyses  the
government ?s overall tsunami defence strategy
for Tōhoku in great detail, including mention of
Tarō,  it  is  worth reviewing this  issue before
proceeding to an analysis of the importance of
addressing the challenges from the perspective
of climate change.
Tarō ?s Seawalls
Tokida  and  Tanimoto  (2014)  examined
combined  sea  defences ?  effectiveness,
suggesting  that  the  flow  and  force  of  the
tsunami can be reduced most effectively with a
seawall,  forested embankment, and manmade
canal. This incorporates the government ?s new
two-level  tsunami  classification  system,
introduced in response to the failure of 2011
(Kanda, 2016; MLIT, 2011; Raby et al,  2015;
Shibayama  et  al,  2013).  Level  1  events  are
considered  tsunami  protection  events  and
assumed to occur every 50-60 to 150-160 years,
with  inundation  depths  of  less  than  7-10m.
Level  2  are  evacuation  events  of  10m+
inundation depth and assumed to occur every
few hundred to a few thousand years apart. The
2011 tsunami is classified Level 2, resembling
the 869CE Jōgan tsunami (Minoura et al, 2001;
Shibayama et al, 2013).
Under  this  classification,  post-2011  defences
are  designed  to  contain  Level  1  events  and
allow Level 2 events to overtop walls without
destroying them, as happened in Fudai in 2011,
with overtopping seawater being collected in a
land side canal  running parallel  (Raby et  al,
2015).  In  addition,  the specifications prevent
land-side scouring caused by retreating waters
pulling seaward, allowing subsequent waves to
flow  through  destroyed  defences.  The  wall ?s
slope is 2:1 on both sides, meaning a 10m wall,
with  a  3m flat  top is  altogether  43m across
(Figure 6),  which is  devastating for sensitive
coastal  ecologies.  Government  literature
addresses  this  but  frames  the  choice  as  a
question of positioning rather than expediency
(Bird, 2013; MLIT, 2011; NACS-J, 2013). The
original pre-2011 X-shaped walls constructed in
Tarō closely resemble this design but were too
small  and  lacked  the  land-side  canal.  Under
these  new recommendations  the  defences  at
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Tarō are therefore being modified with an inner
port  wall  of  14.7m  and  the  original  wall
partially reconstructed and strengthened to a
height of 10-12m (Photos 12-15; Miyako City,
2011), which will provide a base of more than
40m width. In addition, the harbor breakwaters
and  near -shore  tetrapods  are  be ing
strengthened,  replaced and expanded in  size
and  scope,  giving  the  town  four  lines  of
concrete defence, as opposed to three in 2011.
Concrete  defences  in  Tōhoku  have  an
anticipated effective lifespan of approximately
80-100 years, or until 2100-2120.
 
  
Photos 12-15 (July 2017). Click on the photos
for  a  slideshow and hyperlinks  for  a  Google
Earth view.
Photo  12  (https://tinyurl.com/y6x3ddj3):
Cross-sectional view through the central
gate  in  the  main  seawall  at  Tarō.  The
lighter  concrete  atop  the  darker
pre-2011 wall is a recent addition. Click
here for a Google Earth view.
Photo 13 (https://tinyurl.com/y2fxgq8m):
Atop the main seawall, plus its landward
slope.
Photo  14  (https://tinyurl.com/y4kgs3d5):
The  new  internal  breakwater  under
construction at the waterside fishing port
zone.
Photo  15  (https://tinyurl.com/y36jl4y3):
Taken from atop the main seawall, with
debris  from  the  wall ?s  destruction  in
2011  still  evident,  showing  that  the
internal  breakwater  will  obscure ocean
views from all sea level or near sea level
locations in Tarō.
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(Un)Imagining  the  Future?  Climate
Change  and  Tsunami  Size
The reduction in Taro ?s death rate from 83.9%
of  its  population  in  1896,  through  32.5% in
1933,  to  3.9%  in  2011  (Table  2),  indicates
significant  improvements  in  disaster  risk
reduction,  and  in  combining  physical  sea
defences with soft-infrastructure. Nevertheless,
questions arise as to whether, by constructing
defences  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the
previous  disaster,  the  authorities  are
adequately  imagining  and  preparing  for  a
changing  future.  Indeed,  there  is  already
evidence  of  a  public  trust  deficit  in  the
effectiveness  of  the  reconstruction  (Aldrich,
2017;  Aldrich  &  Sawada,  2015;  Bird,  2013;
Strusińska-Correia, 2017).
In the aftermath of the 2011 disaster, the word
sōteigai ( ?beyond expectations ?;  ?unimaginable ?)
was  deployed  by  the  government  and  Tokyo
Electric Power Company to explain their failure
to prevent the nuclear disaster (Samuels, 2013,
104).  Significantly,  the  Japanese  government
acknowledges  the  relationship  between
anthropogenic  climate change and rising sea
levels. Japan is a member of the United Nations
Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change
(UNFCCC), was host to COP3, which produced
the Kyoto Protocol, and is signatory to the 2015
COP21 Paris Agreement, ratified into Japanese
law  on  8  November  2016  (UNFCCC,  2017),
legally committing itself to climate mitigation
and  adaptation.  Here  we  ask  whether
authorities are adequately  ?imagining ? the next
tsunami.
 
 
Between 869 and 2017 an earthquake in the
Japan  Trench  leading  to  a  fatal  tsunami  in
Iwate  Prefecture  has  occurred  on  average
every 104 years (Table 4). Five have resulted in
more than 1,000 deaths, killing approximately
55,963 people; on average, they occurred every
296 years.  However,  the timing of the 1896,
1933 and 2011 tsunami shows that earthquakes
involving  mass  fatalities  are  not  temporally
equidistant  (See:  Lay,  2015;  Smits,  2014).
Hence,  while  it  could  be  argued  the  2011
earthquake  was  unexpected,  it  was  not
unimaginable. It was the fourth most powerful
on Earth since modern records began in 1900,
came less than seven years after the Mw9.1
Indian Ocean earthquake whose tsunami killed
nearly 230,000 people, and two other Mw9.0+
earthquakes have occurred in the Pacific Rim
since 1960.13
Before 2011, Rahmstorf (2007) estimated sea
level will rise 0.5-1.4m by 2100 compared with
1990 and warned that rises could be greater.
Even so, estimates of the rate of sea level rise
are  regularly  revised,  usually  upwards,  as
knowledge of ice sheet melting and analogous
paleoclimatic  conditions  accumulates  and
scenario  model l ing  improves.  Whi le
disagreement remains over the rate of sea level
rise,  it  is  occurring,  and likely  more  rapidly
than  at  any  period  in  the  Earth ?s  history
(Hansen, 2009). Indeed, IPCC AR4 estimated a
global average rise of 0.18-0.59m by 2090-99
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compared with 1980-99; seven years later AR5
estimates a rise of 0.26-0.82m by 2081 ?2100
relative  to  1986 ?2005 (IPCC,  2007:  8;  2014:
13).
Some  argue  that  IPCC  projections  are  too
cautious.  Schaefer  et  al  (2014)  state  that
 ?[C]limate  projections  in   &  (AR5)   &  do  not
adequately account for emissions from thawing
permafrost ?. Hansen et al (2016) assert that a
global  average  2ºC  surface  temperature
increase may result in rises  ?reaching several
meters over a timescale of 50 ?150 years ?, due
to  ?amplifying feedback processes ?; concluding
that  humanity  is  experiencing   ?a  global
emergency ? (2016: 3801). One of these is the
potential  for  ice-cliff  instability  contributing
more than a metre extra to current sea level
rise predictions by 2100 (DeConto & Pollard,
2016).  Furthermore,  although  the   ?Paris
Agreement ?s central aim is to  & pursue efforts
to limit the temperature increase even further
to 1.5 degrees ? (UNFCCC, 2017), assessments
of its achievability are pessimistic (Reilly et al,
2015;  Rogelj  et  al,  2016).  Recent  studies
confirm that  ice-melt  and  sea  level  rise  are
accelerating (IMBIE Team, 2018; Nerem et al,
2018), and that IPCC projections underestimate
future change.
The IPCC (2014) anticipates that current GHG
emissions  trajectories  require  significant
coastal  remodelling  worldwide  this  century,
and the Paris Agreement mandates adaptation
and  mitigation  into  national  laws  (UNFCCC,
2017) .  In  the  USA  th is  inc ludes  new
infrastructure,  land  use  modifications,  and
repair and retrofitting of coastal facilities (EPA,
2017). Recently adaptation there has begun to
include nature-based features (NNBFs) within a
mix of hard, soft, and green infrastructure (Hill,
2015; Bridges, 2015).14
Climate  change  adaptation  is  usually
incremental. Hinkel et al ?s (2018) research in
six  locations  worldwide  concurs  with  this  in
shorter timescales; and it is sensible to assume
that  ongoing  incremental  change  may
accumulate into a transformational adaptation.
Nevertheless,  where  human  systems  may  be
suddenly  overwhelmed,  where  longer
t imesca l e s  a re  i nvo l ved ,  o r  where
incrementalism is insufficient, transformational
adaptation may be required. Kates et al (2012)
argue that these  ?may be difficult to implement
because of uncertainties about climate change
risks and adaptation benefits, the high costs of
transformational actions, and institutional and
behavioural  actions  that  tend  to  maintain
existing resource systems and policies ?;  what
Hinkel et al (2018) refer to as social conflicts,
economic  and  f inancial  barriers,  and
technological  l imits .  They  descr ibe
transformational adaptations as those  ?adopted
at a much larger scale or intensity, those that
are truly new to a particular region or resource
system, and those that  transform places and
shift locations ?, and they can be responsive or
anticipatory. Moreover, they set two conditions
for  implementation;  whether  there  is  large
vulnerability in certain regions, populations, or
resource systems; and whether climate change
threatens  to  overwhelm  even  robust  human
systems.
The eastern coast of Tōhoku fulfils Kates et al ?s
criteria for transformative adaptation.  Ageing
and  depopulation  are  increasing  community
vulnerability  and,  because  these  settlements
are permanently at risk from tsunami, climate
change driven sea level  rise has potential  to
contribute to suddenly overwhelming defence
infrastructure. Consequently, it is reasonable to
ask  whether  and  how  government  planning
anticipates  sea  level  rise  in  settlement
(re)construction in Tōhoku in preparation for
the next giant tsunami.
We analysed 181 post-3/11 basic reconstruction
plans,  plus  updates  and  supplementary
documentation,  from  the  websites  of  the
Reconstruction  Agency;  Iwate,  Miyagi  and
Fukushima  Prefectures;  and  all  36  coastal
municipalities  in  eastern  Tōhoku  (Table  5).
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Using  NVivo  11  we  coded  for  Japanese
language  terms  and  synonyms15  for  climate
change, global warming, greenhouse effect, sea
level  rise,  seawall,  and  tidal  breakwater,
looking  for  mentions  in  combination  to  find
whether authorities were incorporating climate
change driven sea level rise into reconstruction
planning.
We found one mention of climate change driven
sea  level  rise  in  reference  to  protecting
Matsushima Bay ?s natural beauty and ecology.
There were 96 mentions of global warming and
synonyms  in  19  documents,  with  the  most
numerous  in  Miyagi  and  Iwate  Prefectures ?
plans. None associated climate change with sea
level rise, and there were no references to sea
level rise as an additional hazard for tsunami
defence infrastructure.
 
 
Although combined scenario modelling of sea
level  rise and tsunami risks is  still  rare,  the
scientific literature now takes it seriously. Gica
and Reynolds (2012) demonstrate an increased
risk  of  coastal  inundation  at  Midway  from
combined  sea  level  rise  and  Mw8+ tsunami
occurring  in  the  northwestern  Pacific.  And
Ramanamurthy et al (2005: 1740) advise that:
 &  for  long-term human settlement  planning,
safe elevations along with distances from the
coast  or  vulnerability  lines  for  human
settlement, especially in low-lying areas need
to be determined taking in  to  account  other
future  probabilistics  such  as  occurrence  of
epicentre  of  tsunamigenic  earthquake   &
anticipated sea level rise due to global warming
 & etc.
Probabalistic  Tsunami  (Multi-)Hazard
Assessment  (PTHA)  i s  an  important
development in disaster risk reduction science,
with  most  studies  appearing  after  the  2004
Indian  Ocean  tsunami.  Its  purpose  is  to
understand  tsunami  hazard  to  inform  risk
reduction activities by generating hazard maps
or  curves  which  estimate   ?the  probability  of
exceeding specific  levels of  tsunami intensity
metrics  (e.g.,  runup  or  maximum inundation
heights)  (Grezio  et  al,  2017:  1158).  Despite
some criticism of its validity (Mulargia, Stark &
Geller, 2017; Stein, Geller & Liu, 2012), PTHA
is  widely  used for  tsunami  defence  planning
because it is globally applicable to tsunami with
differing  generating  sources  and  return
periods,  and  can  incorporate  epistemic
variation, such as forecasts for sea level rise
(Grezio et al, 2017; Dall ?Osso et al, 2014). Even
so,   ?tsunami  risk  assessments  have  mostly
failed  to  take  in  to  consideration  future  sea
level  r ise  associated  with  enhanced
anthropogenic climate change. As such, future
tsunami  may  well  be  even  worse  than  our
current  best  estimates  as  inundation  may
change markedly as sea level rises ? (Dominey-
Howes & Goff, 2013).
Although PTHA for eastern Tōhoku have been
conducted  for  retrospective  modelling  and
methodological development (Goda et al, 2015;
De Risi & Goda, 2016) to date we are unable to
locate studies where climate change driven sea
level rise has been included as a risk variable.
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M o r e o v e r ,  f o u r  o f f i c i a l s  f r o m  t h e
Reconstruction  Agency  confirmed  in  an
interview that the government had not included
climate change driven sea level rise among its
variables  for  advising  prefectures  and  local
governments  in  Tōhoku  on  coastal  defence
infrastructure  ?because sea level is only rising
very slowly ?.  This begs the question whether
Japanese authorities should build estimates for
sea  level  rise  into  their  scenario  modelling
and/or  reconstruction  and  tsunami  resilience
planning in Tōhoku.
Internationally,  acknowledgement  of  climate
change  as  an  additional  risk  for  tsunami
vulnerability  is  increasing (See:  Hinkel  et al,
2018).  For  example,  Dall ?Osso  et  al  (2014)
suggest  that  Sydney ?s   ?existing  exposure  to
earthquake-generated  tsunamis  is  relatively
low  but  would  increase  significantly  under
higher  sea  level  conditions  caused  by
combinations of tide and/or sea level rise ?. In
New  Zealand,  Tonkin  and  Taylor  Ltd. ?s
consultancy report for Wellington City Council
(Tonkin  &  Taylor  Ltd.,  2013:  63)  assumes
increased risk exposure and that  ?[I]ncreased
sea levels may also mean greater water depths
closer to the shore that can increase near shore
wave  heights  and  may  also  modify  tsunami
impacts ? (2013:  10).  In  2004 Otago Regional
Council collected LiDAR data which  ?enabled a
detailed  hydrodynamic  model  study  to  be
undertaken of the risk of tsunami and storm-
related  inundation  for  the  entire  region,
including an assessment of the potential effects
of  future  sea  level  rise ?  (NZME,  2009:  15).
Indeed, New Zealand ?s government is moving
from deterministic perspectives of disasters as
single  events,  towards  an  approach  that
understands disasters within a dynamic system
of  sudden  events  and  long-term  processes
(NZME,  2009).  As  an  ageing  and  shrinking
society  prone  to  tsunami,  Tōhoku  suits  this
approach.
Among PTHA performed in regions in Asia with
similar physical characteristics to Tōhoku that
do  include  sea  level  rise,  Li  et  al  (2018)
conducted 1,886 scenarios for Macao, which is
vulnerable to tsunami generated by megathrust
earthquakes originating in the Manila Trench.
Their results indicate a sea level rise of  ?0.5m
(by 2060) and 1m (by 2100) would dramatically
increase  the  frequency  of  tsunami-induced
flooding incidences by a factor of 1.2 to 2.4 and
1.5 to 4.7, respectively ?. Li et al also found that
 ?inundation  depths  increase  significantly ?,
noting depths of up to  ?0.2 to 0.5m greater than
the  0.5  and  1m  increased  sea  level ?.  Their
 ?worst  case  scenario ?  modelled  a  Mw9.3
rupture across three earthquake zones along
the Manila Trench, describing its similarity to
the  2011  Tōhoku  earthquake,  showing
extensive  inundation.  Finally,  Li  et  al
emphasise that they use conservative estimates
for  sea  level  rise   ?  that  current  research
suggests a 1.5m rise by 2100 for Macau  ? and
that they used mean high-water as their tidal
variable, stressing that coastlines with a larger
tidal range might have a vulnerability greater
than their scenarios suggest. The ria coastline
of Iwate Prefecture is one such coastline.
The  Tarō  Fishing  Cooperative ?s  port  tower
measures  the  Shōwa Sanriku,  Meiji  Sanriku,
and 2011 tsunami at  10.0,  15.0,  and 17.3m.
Tarō has therefore experienced two,  possibly
three, Level 2 tsunami causing mass fatalities
within  124  years.  The  Japanese  authorities
have not included estimates for the effects of
climate  change  on  sea  levels  and  future
tsunami  height  and  frequency,  despite
scientific research emerging that sea level rise
places coastal communities at elevated risk. It
is possible that, not only will Tarō experience
an increased incidence of  tsunami,  including
Level 2 tsunami, within the next 50-100 years,
but that earthquakes which in the past would
have caused a Level 1 tsunami of 7-10m may in
future create Level 2 events greater than 10m.
In turn, Level 2 tsunami likely may be higher
than current estimates for safe overtopping of
sea defences, increasing the risk of a repeat of
2011  when  the  majority  of  tsunami  defence
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infrastructure was ineffective, with disastrous
consequences  for  vulnerable  ageing  and
shrinking communities like Tarō. Using Li et al
(2018)  and  the  Tarō  fishing  cooperative ?s
measures as a base, it is possible to anticipate
that a Mw9.0 earthquake as occurred in 2011,
with the addition of 1.5m in sea level within the
next  100  years,  would  generate  a  19+m
Tsunami in Tarō, overtopping the highest point
of the new sea defences by more than 4m.
 
Concluding Discussion
The defences nearing completion in Tarō are
stronger  than  previously.  In  the  event  of  a
Level  1  tsunami  they  will  likely  prevent
considerable  damage  and  save  lives.  Tarō ?s
n e w  l a y o u t  i s  a l s o  s a f e r  a n d  s o m e
transformational adaptation to living space is
being implemented, but this is not in response
to climate change. Notwithstanding, we have
shown that it is not unimaginable for sea level
to rise such that some Level 1 tsunami events
will become Level 2, and for Level 2 events to
become large enough potentially to overwhelm
defences, just as the  ?unimaginable ? tsunami of
11 March 2011 overwhelmed what were then
the strongest defences ever built in Tarō and
Kamaishi.  Consequently,  we  argue  that  the
government ?s rationale for the construction of
the  wall  is  potentially  insufficient,  given  the
accumulated  risks  of  another  powerful
undersea earthquake occurring in the region,
global warming driven sea level rise changing
the dynamics of tsunami in unpredictable ways,
and coastal communities will  be considerably
different in their size and composition in the
decades  to  come.  Nevertheless,  important
though  the  social  capital  perspective  is  in
demanding  the  development  of  systems  of
mutual  aid  in  local  communities  at  risk  of
disaster,  i t  is  necessari ly  one  part  of
implementing  a  disaster  prevention  strategy
that responds to the whole spectrum of risks
involved  in  complex  techno-environmental
events  and  acknowledges  the  need  for
transformational adaptation to the impacts of
climate change.
At  the  start  of  this  article  we  argued  that
discussions  of  climate  change  mitigation  are
beyond our scope. In many respects, however,
mitigation  is  necessarily  part  of  any  truly
transformational adaptation strategy since, for
example,  climate  change  requires  radical
decarbonisation in response. Indeed, does not
transformational adaption therefore require a
reconfiguration  of  the  social  and  economic
system beyond removing fossil fuels towards a
deprioritisation  of  growth  in  favour  of
resilience and sustainability? Hence, instead of
understanding  depopulation  as  a  problem in
search of more people, even a social crisis, isn ?t
it time that Japan looks to the opportunities it
presents  in  imagining  a  different  future   ?  a
 ?depopulation dividend ? (Matanle, 2017)?
In April 2011, then Prime Minister Kan Naoto
appointed the Reconstruction Design Council to
produce  a   ?grand  vision ?  for  Tōhoku ?s
reconstruction  which  would  not  be   ?stuck
within a traditional framework ? and would be
 ?highly  regarded in  history ?.  Moreover,  plans
should  have  local  ownership  and  result  in
creative outcomes, should emphasise  ?harmony
among nature, human beings and technology ?,
provide   ?clean  energy ?  solutions,  and  they
should  inspire  hope  for  the  future  (Prime
Minister ?s  Office,  2011).  This  was  a  call  for
transformational  adaption  both  of  coastal
communities in Tōhoku, where incrementalism
had  been  insufficient  in  preventing  mass
fatalities,  as  well  as  Japan ?s  energy  system
towards  one  that  is  less  centralised,  is
ecologically  sustainable,  and which would be
resilient  to  disasters.  Five  months  later  Kan
was forced to resign.
Ever since the Meiji  period (1868-1912),  the
use  of  concrete  infrastructure  to  resolve
contradictions  between  the  logic  of  modern
development and the perceived constraints of
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nature  has  been  deeply  institutionalised  in
Japan.  In response to the remodelling of  the
Tone and Watarase River basins as a result of
the  Ashio  Copper  Mine  disaster  (1880),  the
founder  of  Japan ?s  environmental  movement,
Tanaka Shōzō, criticised the government ?s lack
of  imagination  by  arguing  that  it  was  not
nature that was defective, and which needed
correcting  with  the  application  of  modern
technocratic  rationalism,  but  modern
developmentalism,  which  placed  humanity
outside nature and, as others have also argued,
at war with it (Carson, 1962: 7; Foster et al,
2010; Marcuse, 1972: 52). In so doing Tanaka
placed  humanity  within  nature  and  urged
modern Japanese to adjust to its flow (nagare),
rather than attempt to defend against it, lest
they are undone by the force of its backflow
(gyakuryū)  (Littler,  2017;  Stolz,  2007;  2014;
Tanaka, 2004 & 2005).
Through the ages a common strategic error has
been  to  prepare  for  the  past  by  failing  to
imagine  the  future.  European  schoolchildren
are  taught  France ?s  catastrophic  mistake  in
constructing the Maginot line in the 1930s, for
example, which was built to defend against the
type of assault by Germany that had occurred
in 1914, but resulted in the encirclement and
near  annihilation  of  the  allied  forces  at
Dunkirk,  and  effectively  allowed  France ?s
defeat and occupation. Nearly a century later
and facing the twin 21st century challenges of
depopulation  and  global  warming,  Japan  is
potentially in the vanguard of a transformation
to a sustainable post-growth order in Asia (See:
DeWit,  2015;  Matanle,  2017).  However,  by
adopting an incremental approach to disaster
prevention  in  Tōhoku  and  its  reluctance  to
imagine the consequences of climate change,
the Japanese state demonstrates that it is yet to
seize  that  opportunity .  Instead,  the
Construct ion  State  (Feldhoff ,  2002;
McCormack,  2002)  and  its  logic  of  modern
developmentalism  as  a  defensive  bulwark
a g a i n s t  t h e  a s s u m e d  d e s t r u c t i v e
encroachments of nature remains in place.
Sea-levels  will  likely  rise  more  rapidly  and
higher  than  much of  the  science  on  climate
change at present suggests. Recent discoveries
in  the  arctic  permafrost  show  thawing
 ?exceeding  modelled  future  thaw  depths  for
2090 under IPCC RCP 4.5 ? (Farquharson et al,
2019), in other words 70 years in advance of
that  projected by  the United Nations  official
documentation  on  which  are  based  the
international treaties that Japan has signed into
law and relies upon to help guide its adaptation
policy.  Consequently,  even  the  most  highly
regarded  coastal  defence  projects,  such  as
those in the Netherlands and Venice, may have
shorter lives than publicly acknowledged due to
the  rapid  onset  of  climate  change  and  its
impacts on human-environmental relationships.
It is disconcerting for us to observe the lack of
acknowledgement  of  sea  level  rise  among
governments  and  engineers,  whilst  planning
projects  intended  to  last  for  more  than  50
years. Humanity has a limited time window to
mitigate  and  adapt  to  the  impacts  of  global
warming. We have known for many decades, if
not  a  century  or  more,  that  environmental
systems are sensitive  to  human activity,  and
that  positive  feedback  loops  can  exacerbate
and accelerate changes already under way. At
the time that Tanaka Shōzō was campaigning
to save his village, Yanaka, from the Japanese
government ?s  remodelling  of  the  Kanto
watershed,  and building on the 19th century
work of Fourier, Pouillet, Foote, and Tyndall, in
1896 Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius made
the  first  quantitative  prediction  of  global
warming  under  a  doubling  of  atmospheric
carbon dioxide (Arrhenius, 1896). In the 21st
century,  as  younger people imagine a much-
altered future for themselves (Thunberg, 2019),
we would all do well to heed Tanaka ?s words.
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Notes
1 Japan ?s whole eastern coastline is undergoing redevelopment of its tsunami defence
infrastructure (NASC, 2014). Tōhoku (lit. East-North  ? 東北) includes the six northernmost
prefectures of Honshu: Aomori, Akita, Iwate, Yamagata, Miyagi, and Fukushima.
2 See Matanle (2011) for a description of the disaster and its immediate aftermath.
3 As of writing in 2018, these structures are nearing completion.
4 There is a long-running semantic debate as to the correct terminology to describe the
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greenhouse effect and the Earth ?s climate.  ?Climate change ? and  ?global warming ? are both
contested terms, though they are currently the most commonly used. Increasingly, terms such
as  ?climate breakdown ?,  ?climate emergency ? and  ?climate crisis ? are being used to refer to the
former, and  ?global heating ? for the latter. In this article we use  ?climate change ? and  ?global
warming ?, though we prefer the newer terms. We do so from the perspective of not wanting
semantic discussions to distract from the core message of our research. See Carrington
(2019) for a deeper discussion of these terms ? usage.
5 Recently Aldrich et al (2019) have been rather less enthusiastic about Japan ?s success with
climate change mitigation.
6 A ria coastline comprises several roughly parallel inlets separated by mountain ranges.
Unlike fjords, which are U-shaped inundated valleys scoured by glaciation, rias are
unglaciated river valleys that subsequently flooded when the ice retreated and sea-level rose
at the end of the last ice age. Consequently, they often have low-lying and sheltered alluvial
fans at their head which are attractive for human settlement. Other examples include the
western coast of Galicia, Spain, and the Marlborough Sounds at the northern end of South
Island, New Zealand.
7 All photographs in this article © Peter Matanle.
8 See Rausch (2012) for a summary analysis of the Heisei municipal mergers.
9 The crude birth rate measures the average number of children born per 1,000 population,
and the total fertility rate the average number of children born per woman over her lifetime.
Currently in Japan the birth rate is falling, because the total number of women giving birth
has dropped precipitously, even as the fertility rate has risen slightly.
10 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
11 Defined as a tsunami causing at least one fatality in Japan.
12 Information on public meetings and published planning documentation produced by Miyako
City Office can be found on the City ?s website here
(http://www.city.miyako.iwate.jp/higashi.html). Information specific to the reconstruction of
Tarō District is archived by Miyako City here
(http://www.city.miyako.iwate.jp/index/sosiki/taro.html).
13 1960 Valdivia, Chile (Mw9.5); 1964 Prince William Sound, Alaska (Mw9.2).
14 Despite the Trump administration ?s disavowal of the 2015 Paris Agreement, and its policy of
undoing the previous Obama administration ?s actions on climate change, considerable activity
in climate mitigation and adaptation is accelerating at state and municipal levels, among
some federal institutions, and some private and third sector organisations (See, for example,
New York Times, 2019).
15 Weblio Thesaurus (http://thesaurus.weblio.jp/) was used to generate the following terms:
Warming: 温暖化, 温室効果; Climate change: 気候変動, 気候変更, 気候変化, 異常気象; Sea
level rise: 海面上昇, 水面上昇, 海水準変動, 海面水位変化, 海面変化; Sea wall: 防潮堤, 防波
堤, 海壁, 波除, 波戸, 波止.
